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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case Noi. 14541

KENNETH YARDLEY, d/b/a
YARDLEY DAIRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is a declaratory judgment attion to determine whether or not the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley, is afforded insurance coverage under a policy of insurance issued
by the Plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange, for claims made
against him by James Cole, who was injure4 in an accident
occurring on January 25, 1973.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER CpURT
The case came on for trial before a jury on April 22,
1975, to determine the question of coverage under the policy
of insurance.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the

trial court excused the jury and heard atid granted over De-

fendant's objection the Motion of Plaintiff that the Court
rule as a matter of law that the relationship between the
Defendant and James Cole was that of employer-employee,
and not that of principal-independent contractor.

The

Court, having ruled as a matter of law as to the employment
relationship between the Defendant and James Cole, officially discharged the jury and removed from its consideration
all factual issues in the case.

The Plaintiff further moved

the Court to determine as a matter of law whether or not
there was coverage under the policy of insurance.

The

latter motion was taken under advisement by the Court.

On

January 3, 1976, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, finding that the injuries of James Cole
arose out of and in the scope of his employment for the
insured, and concluding that at the time of the injury, James
Cole "was an employee of the Defendant acting in the course
of his employment by the Defendant, and no coverage was afforded to the Defendant under the policy of insurance of the
Plaintiff for the claim made by James Cole against the Defendant or for the law suit filed by James Cole against the
Defendant.11

On February 3, 1976, the Court entered Judgment,

adjudging and decreeing that the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley,
is afforded no coverage under his insurance policy with the
Plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange, for the said injuries
sustained by James Cole.

The Court made no award with re-

spect to costs of the action.

-2-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to remand the
case to the trial court for the purpose of submitting to
the jury the question of:
1.

Whether the relationship between the Defendant,

Kenneth Yardley, and James Cole was that of employer-employee or principal-independent contractor,
2.

Whether the injury sustained by Jarr^es Cole consti-

tutes a bodily injury arising out of and in the course of
said James Cole's employment by the insuredr
This request for remand to the trial C]burt is made on
the following grounds:
1.

There is not a sufficient factual basis upon which

the Court, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Defendant, may determine as a matter of law that
the employment relationship between the Defendant and James
Cole was that of employer-employee.

The Cfourt, in so find-

ing, invaded the province of the jury.
2.

The trial court further invaded tthe province of

the jury by removing from the juryfs consideration the
essential factual issue of whether or not James Cole's injuries constituted bodily injury "arising out of and in the
course of his employment by the insured..,.".

STATEMENT OF THE FACT$
For the last several years, Defendant has been the
owner and operator of a small dairy operation, known as
-3-

Yardley Dairy, located in Beaver County, State of Utah.
The dairy is for the most part a family operation involving the Defendant, his wife, his father and a son.
Due to the relatively small size of the dairy operation, it has not been necessary for the Defendant to hire
additional persons to help him on a permanent basis. Occasionally, however, it has become necessary, from time to
time, to hire temporary seasonal help, particularly in the
fall of the year (Tr. 76)*.
In the fall of the year 1972, the Defendant hired
James Cole, whom he knew to be a retired professional truck
driver, to haul silage by truck from the cornfields in Milford, Utah, to the Defendant's dairy operation in Greenville,
both in Beaver County.

For hauling the silage, the Defendant

paid James Cole on a per-hour basis, and the Defendant provided the truck and supplied the gas, oil and maintenance
for the truck (Tr. 12, 78, 79).
James Cole performed several other odd jobs for the
Defendant and was paid generally on a per-hour basis. However, sometime during the winter of 1972, Mr. Cole contracted with the Defendant to haul grain from a grain elevator
in Venice, Utah (near Richfield) to Defendant's dairy operation in Greenville.

The round trip, including the loading

of the truck at the grain elevator, required at least three
and a half hours (Tr. 86). It was agreed that the Defendant would pay Mr. Cole a flat fee of $15 per trip, regard*Re£erence is hereby made to particular pages of the transcript of the trial.
-4-

less of the actual amount of time Mr. Cole wajs gone. (Tr.
21-23, 85-87, 113).
The grain was used in Defendant's dairy operation and
was fed to the dairy cows during the milking process.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the defendant notified Mr. Cole whenever the level of the grjain in Defendant's granary reached the point where ther^ was only
enough grain for approximately one more day4

The need

for another load of grain was usually communicated to Mr.
Cole the evening before the trip was to be pade.

The fol-

lowing morning, Mr. Cole arrived at the dairy, at which
time the truck was normally ready for Mr. Cole to take to
Venice for a load of grain.

The only duties that Mr. Cole

had under the contract were to drive the t^ruck to Venice,
load it, place a tarp over the truck and derive the load of
grain back to Yardley Dairy.

Mr. Yardley &nd Mr. Cole

both testified at the trial that unloading the truck at
the Yardley Dairy was not a part of Mr. Cole's responsibilities under the grain hauling arrangement (Tr. 22, 112).
The normal method employed by the Defendant to unload the load of grain into the grain bin is well established
in the facts and undisputed.

The grain b|in has a capacity

slightly less than the truck.

The truck is backed up to

the grain elevator, a tractor with a pow^r takeoff shaft is
backed up to the side of the elevator, tlfie power takeoff
shaft is attached to the drive shaft of the elevator and the
power takeoff mechanism on the tractor is engaged, causing
the elevator to operate.

The power hoisft on the truck is
-5-

then raised and the flow of the grain from the truck is
adjusted to the capacity of the grain elevator (Tr. 106).
Because of the difference between the capacity of the
grain bin and that of the truck, there is normally some
grain left over in the truck when the grain bin becomes
completely full (Tr. 107).
On a single occasion, prior to the date that Mr.
Cole sustained certain injuries (described hereafter)^
Mr. Cole was asked to assist in the unloading process.
For his assistance, the Defendant paid him $10 in addition to the $15 for hauling the grain.
On the morning of January 25, 1973, Mr. Cole arrived
at the Yardley Dairy for the purpose of getting the truck
to obtain another load of grain from Venice.

The Defen-

dant had notified him either the night before or that
same morning, as was customary, that another load was
needed (Tr. 29). When he arrived, the hoist on the truck
was still in an elevated position, and there was still a
small amount of grain left in the back corners of the truck
bed.

When Mr. Cole arrived to pick up the truck, the De-

fendant was in the final process of milking the cows.

At

this point in the testimony at trial, there exists a factual dispute as to whether or not Mr. Cole was asked or
authorized by the Defendant to assist in unloading the remaining portion of the grain from the truck.

Mr. Cole

testified that he was asked to assist John Cartwright, a
part-time employee of the Defendant, with the unloading
(Tr. 29). The Defendant, on the other hand, testified
-6-

that he told Mr. Cole that he would have to v^ait approximately thirty minutes until the finaJ two set^s of cows
were milked, and then the Defendant would finish unloading
the truck (Tr. 109-112).
At any rate, while the Defendant was finishing the
milking, Mr. Cole became involved in the unloading process and was injured.
Thereafter, Mr. Cole filed a civil sui^: against the
Defendant for damages resulting from his injjury. The
Defendant referred the claim to the Plaintijff insurance
company, and this declaratory judgment action was brought
thereafter.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BA$IS UPON WHICH
THE COURT, WHEN VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN A,'LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT, MAY DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND JAMES COLE WAS THAT OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE. THE
COURT, IN SO FINDING, INVADED THE PROVINCjE OF THE JURY.
The question of whether a particular employment relationship is that of employer-employee cj>r principalindependent contractor is generally considered to be a
question of fact, particularly where the facts surrounding
the particular relationship are in conflfict. Beutler v.
MacGregor Triangle Company, 85 Idaho 41^, 380 P. 2d 1
(1963).

An employment status becomes a question of law

only if from all of the facts only a single inference and
one conclusion may be drawn, whether oxi£ be an employee
-7-

or independent contractor*

Yucaipa Farmers Co-op Associa-

tion v, Industrial Accident Commission, 55 C. A. 2d 234,
130 P. 2d 146 (1942).

In other words, a trial court, sitting

with a jury, may not rule as a matter of law that an employer-employee relationship exists under certain circumstances
where the inference may be reasonably drawn from the facts
that a principal-independent contractor relationship exists
under those same circumstances.

It is Defendant's position

that the facts in the record of this case, when viewed in
a light most favorable to the Defendant and in accordance
with the authorities cited hereafter, reasonably support
the inference that a jury could draw that the relationship
existing between the Defendant and James Cole was that of
principal-independent contractor.
It is apparent, from an examination of the cases involving the independent contractor relationship, that
there is no absolute rule for determining whether one is an
independent contractor or an employee, and that each case
must be determined on its own facts.

41 Am Jur 2d 743.

There are, however, a number of fairly typical indicia of
the status of an independent contractor, and it is generally
recognized that the presence of one or more of such indicia
in a case is not necessarily conclusive.

41 Am Jur 2d 743.

According to the Restatement of Agency 2d, the following
matters of fact, among others, are considered in determining
whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor:

-8-

(a) The extent of control which, by th^ agreement, the master may exercise over the details
of the work.
(b) Whether or not the one employed is engaged
in a distinct occupation or business.
(c) The kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is Ujsually
done under the direction of the employer or by
a specialist without supervision.
(d) The skill required in a particular occupation.
(e) Whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools and the p^Lace of
work for the person doing the work.
(f) The length of time for which the person is
employed.
(g) The method of payment, whether by the time
or by the job.
(h) Whether or not the work is a part| of the
regular business of the employer.
(i) Whether or not the parties believe that they
are creating a relation of master and servant.
(j) Whether the principal is or is nbt in business.
Restatement of Agency 2d, Sec. 220 (2|).
It should be noted that the so calle4 "independent
calling11 or "own business11 test, item (b) above, is not
followed in the State of Utah.

Christean v. Industrial

Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (JL948).
In the Christean case, supra, this C^urt adopted the
rest of the criteria set forth in the Resjtatement of Agency,
Sec. 220, supra, for making the distinction between the two
employment relationships.

In a later ca$e, while endorsing

the result in Christean, supra, this Cou^t stated that the
elements of control by the employer and f:he intent of the
-9-

parties are the most important factors, but that none of
the factors separately is controlling; all factors must be
considered together in order to make the proper determination.

Sutton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 9 Utah 2d

339, 344 P. 2d 538 (1959).
Concerning the intent of the parties, it should be
remembered that when asked what his personal view of his
role in the employinent relationship was, Cole unequivocally
responded, "independent contractor" (Tr. 55). The Defendants testimony regarding his view of the relationship
strongly suggests that he believed and intended the relationship to be that of principal-independent contractor
(Tr. 112, 113).
The element of control, as well as the other typical
status-determining factors, can best be applied to the
instant factual setting through the analysis of a case
handed down by the Utah Supreme Court in 1946, cited as
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.
2d 136 (1946).

In Parkinson, a certain Molyneaux contracted

with Parkinson, the receiver of a manufacturing company,
to haul sufficient coke to keep the company supplied at all
times.

The company needed coke for its manufacturing busi-

ness just as it required raw materials for its products.
The contract in Parkinson, as in the Yardley case, was
a type of requirements contract.

Molyneaux contracted with

Parkinson to haul sufficient coke to keep the company supplied at all times.

It was understood that to keep the

company supplied Molyneaux would have to haul a minimum
(10^

of thirty-five tons of coke per week.

He coi^ld haul such

additional amounts as he desired, limited only by the
company's coke storage capacity.

As will be recalled

from the evidence, it was the storage capacity of Yardley's storage bin and the rate at which the tows ate the
grain that determined the number of trips required to
obtain grain.
In Parkinson, the company was primarily interested
in obtaining the coke on time and having it deposited
at convenient places. Whether the coke was hauled by
direct or circuitous route, how long the trips required,
what other business the hauler may have involved himself
with during trips or between the trips, etc., was immaterial to the company so long as it always had readily
available sufficient coke to operate its plant.

The record

in the Yardley case, poses a very similar set of facts.
Mr. Yardley's main concern and requirement} were that there
was always grain available to feed his cows while they were
milked.

Due to the capacity of his storage bin, it

naturally followed that the need for another load of grain
only arose at such time as the storage bin was empty or
very nearly empty.

It would have been counterproductive,

certainly, to make trips more frequently and to leave larger
quantities of the grain in the truck, exposed to the elements.
It was immaterial to Mr. Yardley ho^z long Mr. Cole
took or what time he left to get a load of grain.

The De-

fendant did express some concern, however, that Mr. Cole

(ID

return within the day for his own safety and protection
and so that there would be grain available to feed the
cows (Tr. 113, 114).
It was also immaterial to the Defendant that Mr. Cole,
on some of the trips, pursued his own independent interests,
including a small egg selling business, which involved the
frequent purchase of eggs while en route and their resale
back in Beaver County.

He was also free to allow any

passengers to accompany him, which he did on at least one
occasion (Tr. 48, 49). At this point, it should be noted
that the Yardley case differs slightly from the Parkinson
case in the respect that Molyneaux owned and used his own
truck in the hauling process and paid his own expenses,
while Cole, who was a retired truck driver and did not own
a truck, drove the Defendantfs truck.

The Defendant also

provided the gas, oil and maintenance for the truck.
However, whether a contractor or employer furnishes or does
not furnish the appliances for the job is not in itself
decisive.

H

A contractor may be independent, where he has

control of the doing of the work, although the employer...
furnishes certain appliances and tools for the prosecution
of the work."

41 Am Jur 2d 760; Peck v. Woomack, 65 Nev.

184, 192 P. 2d 874 (1948).
With the exception of the frequency of the required
trips and the equipment used in making the trips, Mr. Cole
had control of the means and manner of accomplishing the
job, as well as of the result.

He was never required to

account for the miles driven, time spent or gas used.
(12)

The arrival of a load of grain, when needed, was the only
item contracted for, and both Mr. Cole and the Defendant
are in agreement on that.

And for that end result, the

Defendant agreed to pay and Mr. Cole, in fact, received
$15 per trip (Tr. 51, 112).
In Parkinson, Molyneaux was paid by the ton for hauling coke.

The measure and time of payment, when considered

with the other typical indicia, are helpful in determining
the status of an employment relationship.

This Court in

Stover Bedding Company v. Industrial Commission, cited at
99 Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027 (1940), stated the following:
The following circumstances generally tend to
indicate an independent contractor relationship:
(1) Where the person employed undertakes to perform the stipulated work as a whole for a specific
sum; (2) Where the remuneration of the person
employed is computed with reference to the quantity of work performed by him.
In the instant case, counsel for Plaintiff attempted
to emphasize and reemphasize that the Defendant could have
discharged Mr. Cole without incurring any contractual liability.

This Court, in Parkinson, at p. 140, expressed the

opinion from all the facts and circumstances of the Parkinson case that the company did not have the control of
Molyneaux contemplated by the statute to make the relationship that of employer-employee.

The Court further stated,

"the facts that the company could determine the place where
the work was to be done and had the right to discharge
Molyneaux at any time without contractual liability are not
controlling.

Anyone employing an independent contractor...

has the right to determine where he wants the work to be
(13)

done*., the mere right to discharge without contractual
liability is not sufficient control to make an employeremployee relationship though it is a factor to be considered with all the other pertinent facts and circumstances in determining that relationship.11

Parkinson

v. Industrial Commission, supra, at p. 140.
The Court in Parkinson also considered the factor
of whether or not the work performed by Molyneaux was
a part or process in the trade or business of the employer within the meaning of the statute.

The Court determined,

that while the obtaining of the coke was a necessary condition for the carrying on of the companyfs business, the
company was not in the trucking business nor in the business of selling coke.

Parkinson v. Industrial Commission,

supra, at p. 140. The same argument applies in the instant
case.

While the obtaining of the grain was a necessary

condition for the carrying on of the Yardley Dairy's business, the company was not in the trucking business nor in
the business of selling grain.

The hauling of grain was,

therefore, not "a part or process in the trade or business11
of Yardley Dairy.
Finally, concerning the factor of the skill required
in a particular occupation, the Defendant testified that he
was well aware of Mr. Cole's past background and experience
as a professional truck driver and that the Defendant's
knowledge thereof was one of the considerations in his
hiring Mr. Cole to drive the truck (Tr. 98). Mr. Cole testified that he had been a professional truck driver for 23
(14)

or 24 years prior to his retirement from the profession
in approximately the year 1968 (Tr. 31, 32). He later
moved to Beaver, Utah, from the Southern California area
and took what jobs he could find in the area, including
some truck driving, in order to supplement his
33).

income (Tr.

Mr. Yardleyfs knowledge and reliance upon his pro-

fessional competence as a truck driver should, at least,
be considered as a factor in determining th^ nature of
the employment relationship.
The Court in Parkinson found Molyneaux to be an independent contractor and reversed the award) of the
Industrial Commission.

The Defendant in thje instant

case respectfully submits that in light of the foregoing
authorities and analysis, and particularly in view of the
similarity between the instant case and the Parkinson case,
there remains an essential question of fact that should
have been submitted to the jury.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER INVADED THE PROVINCE OF THE
JURY BY REMOVING FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION THE ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT JAMES COLE'S INJURIES
CONSTITUTED BODILY INJURY "ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED...".
Once the nature of the employment relationship in the
instant case is properly determined by the jury, there still
remains the factual inquiry of whether ot not the facts and
circumstances of the instant case fit one or more of the
exclusions in the policy of insurance issued by Plaintiff
(15)

to the Defendant, and whether, based on that initial
determination, whether there is coverage under the policy.
Even if the trial court had properly ruled as a matter of
law that an employer-employee relationship existed, the
Court would still be required to submit the remaining
factual issues to the jury unless there existed an adequate factual basis upon which the Court could, as a matter
of law, rule that coverage was excluded under the policy.
In this case, the Court did not rule as a matter of law
but rather as a matter of fact that

f,

the injuries of James

Cole arose out of and in the scope of his employment for
the insured as other than a domestic employee."
Court's Finding of Fact No. 7.

c.f. Trial

The Court ruled based on

the seven Findings of Fact made by the Court, not by the
jury, that there was no coverage under the insurance policy.
Defendant respectfully submits that it was error for
the Court to sit as finder of fact in a case where the jury
had been requested and had been given the sole responsibility.
Naturally, counsel for the parties, or the parties themselves,
may narrow the issues to be presented to the jury by stipulation or other agreement.

There is some language in the re-

cord by the Court that would tend to suggest that the Court
was of the impression that the parties or their counsel had
narrowed the issues (Tr. 121, 122); however, the record itself
is devoid of any stipulation or agreement on the part of parties or their counsel to remove from the jury's consideration
any and all factual questions other than the question of the
nature of the employment relationship.

For the reasons stated

herein, all issues of fact in the instant case should
have been submitted to the jury for their determination;
and the trial court erred in pre-empting the prerogative
of the jury.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, and pursuant to the
authorities stated, the Appellant respectfully prays
this Court to remand the case to the trial court for the
purpose of submitting to the jury:
1.

The question of whether the relationship between

the Defendant, Kenneth Yardley, and James Cole was that of
employer-employee or principal-independent contractor,
2.

The question of whether thefajury sustained by

James Cole constitutes a bodily injury arising out of and
in the course of said James Colefs employment by the insured.
3.

All other issues of fact remaining in the case.

Respectfully Submitted,
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